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Nepal: Peace Postponed 
I. OVERVIEW 
Nepal’s progress toward lasting peace is seriously but 
not yet irreparably faltering. A further postponement of 
constituent assembly (CA) elections reflected the weak 
implementation of the November 2006 Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) and lack of will to follow the 
agreed process. Leaders have now vowed to forge a new 
consensus and agreed to hold the elections by mid-April 
2008 but have yet to address the problems that led to past 
postponements. Suspicions among the parties – especially 
between Nepali Congress (NC), which dominates the 
government, and the Maoists, who remain outside – are 
echoed in ebbing public confidence: whatever promises 
they hear, most voters believe the politicians prefer to 
stay in power rather than face the electorate. All parties 
urgently need to inject new momentum into the peace 
process and take steps to win back trust and earn 
legitimacy. The international community can support them 
in this but must also maintain pressure to keep the polls 
and peace process on track. 
The peace process from the outset was based more on a 
convergence of interests than a common vision. The threat 
of a resurgent monarchy prodded mainstream parties and 
Maoists into alliance, but their major remaining shared 
interest is continuation in power. Even when elections 
seemed to be on track, no party paid more than lip service 
to calls for broader public participation in the constitutional 
process. Popular pressure to move the process ahead 
is not likely to worry political leaders. Civil society is 
divided, and the public has few openings to channel 
its pressure; the ultimate option of a mass movement is, 
for now, improbable. Constructive proposals have little 
outlet; parliamentary opposition is weak and without 
constitutional standing. 
The peace plan was not inherently flawed, but it depended 
on all parties reforming their political behaviour, a 
process that should have been founded on implementing 
commitments starting from the November 2005 agreement 
between the mainstream parties and the Maoists. It also left 
many crucial issues to be negotiated at an unspecified date. 
The erosion of a common platform is not surprising. The 
consensus on power sharing that existed is foundering on 
partisanship and disputes over patronage. The prospect of 
impending polls has added to manoeuvring and further 
weakened unity. Although all parties are still talking, 
mutual recrimination has grown. 
Other options are now likely to come into focus, although 
none yet appears attractive enough to win critical support. 
Talk of a new “nationalist alliance” – with Maoists and 
renegade NC leaders courting the royalist constituency – 
may for now be a bargaining tactic but underlines the 
seven-party grouping’s fragility. This has constitutional 
ramifications: the interim constitution cannot function 
without seven-party unity. Those in power, as well as the 
palace and the army, might not be disappointed with 
another deferral of elections but prolongation of the 
current limbo has little to offer the nation. It could provide 
stability in Kathmandu and a new lease on life for a 
modified power-sharing formula but the capital’s political 
games increasingly fail to reflect the realities of a turbulent 
country. 
Holding an increasingly fractious nation together requires 
more than reapportioning the Kathmandu spoils. It needs 
action rather than the usual quick-fix backroom deals 
which command less and less credibility. The two armed 
forces have started to exert greater influence on the 
positions of the sides; neither has been defeated, and each 
would like to establish its own red lines. Maoist fighters 
have already left the cantonments in large numbers; 
on completion of the UN verification process, thousands 
of disqualified personnel will be discharged with no 
realistic plan for how to deal with them. Maoist parallel 
structures, notably the Young Communist League (YCL), 
which is already led by People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
commanders, still hold sway over much of the country. 
Elsewhere identity-based movements have left political 
calculations in flux and law and order in tatters. The 
resignation of Madhesi parliamentarians, including an 
NC minister, to form a new party suggests the Tarai 
unrest may finally be impinging on national power games. 
In this inherently unstable situation, Nepal risks slipping 
back toward renewed conflict even if no party actively 
seeks it. Two intact armies remain ready to fight. 
This fundamentally adversarial structure blocks other 
confidence-building efforts. A disillusioned public will 
have little appetite to defend parties which have betrayed 
their promises to reform and seek a new mandate. Many 
fear the opportunity for securing peace and institutional 
change is already lost. More militant groups stand to gain. 
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The one hopeful sign is growing recognition in all parties 
that implementation of existing agreements is a priority. 
If this is coupled with the will to create conditions for 
holding elections by mid-April 2008 as promised, it could 
produce a genuine popular endorsement and stabilise 
the country. 
The seven parties (government and Maoists) should: 
? preserve unity through a combination of immediate 
confidence-building measures, jointly reaffirming 
the CPA’s shared vision, developing consensual 
decision-making procedures and transparently 
negotiating a durable power-sharing deal to bring 
the Maoists back into government, including if 
necessary a cabinet reshuffle and discussions on 
the shape of a post-electoral consensus government; 
? demonstrate commitment through behaviour – 
with the Maoists halting parallel activities and other 
abuses of the CPA, and other parties setting an 
example by fulfilling their own commitments in 
a non-partisan fashion; 
? engage with other parties represented in the 
legislature or registered for the elections and with 
civil society to build broader support for the 
electoral and peace process and avoid charges of 
narrow self-interest, including considering specific 
mechanisms for consensus building; 
? review progress on implementing the CPA and 
subsequent agreements, establish mandated 
committees (and report to the public regularly 
on their progress) and tackle the gaps in earlier 
negotiations by initiating discussions on such issues 
as security sector reform (SSR); 
? review the role of the NC-led Ministry of Peace 
and Reconstruction and consider forming an all-
party mechanism to oversee the peace deal, backed 
by an independent monitoring body; 
? refocus on the constitutional process, developing 
mechanisms to bring in the public in order to ensure 
it is meaningful and convince Nepalis elections are 
serious; 
? develop a viable public security plan to rebuild 
confidence in the police, uphold the rule of law and 
end impunity whether of state or non-state actors 
and reestablish local government based at a 
minimum on seven-party and community consensus; 
and 
? increase the focus on political inclusiveness, starting 
by implementing agreements on representation 
of women, janajatis, Madhesis, Dalits and other 
groups. 
International actors should: 
? agree on a common message pressing for a realistic 
roadmap to elections, offering support and reminding 
all that international recognition is conditional upon 
demonstrated commitment to peace and democracy; 
? UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) should continue to 
clarify its role, improving communication with the 
public to counter criticism about lack of transparency; 
and 
? donors should only support projects with all-party 
approval and demonstrably in line with peace 
process goals, including strengthening local 
governance to contribute to confidence-building and 
service-delivery to local communities to convey 
the sense of a peace dividend. 
II. AN UNSUSTAINABLE STASIS 
A. WHAT HAPPENED TO THE PEACE 
PROCESS? 
Constituent assembly elections have twice been postponed.1 
Following the failure to meet a June 2007 target, the 22 
November date was abandoned on 5 October. The Maoist 
demands, which were the most immediate cause of the 
November postponement, have led to signs of a political 
reconfiguration within the seven-party grouping.2 In 
temporary alliance with the UML, the Maoists used the 
interim legislature to pass non-binding, but symbolically 
significant, resolutions calling for immediate declaration 
of a republic (with gradual implementation) and a fully 
proportional electoral system (not yet clearly defined). As 
 
 
1 On the political tensions that led to the October 2007 
postponement, see Crisis Group Asia Briefing Nº68, Nepal’s 
Fragile Peace Process, 28 September 2007. Other recent Crisis 
Group reporting on Nepal includes Asia Reports N°128, Nepal’s 
Constitutional Process, 26 February 2007; N°132, Nepal’s 
Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists?, 18 May 2007; and N°136, 
Nepal’s Troubled Tarai Region, 9 July 2007. Nepali translations 
of all these reports are now available at www.crisisgroup.org. 
2 In this briefing the term “seven parties” refers to the six 
mainstream parties and the CPN(M). The “six parties” are the 
continuation of the Seven-Party Alliance, whose membership 
was reduced when the Nepali Congress and Nepali Congress 
(Democratic) reunited. Past Crisis Group reporting referred to this 
alliance as the SPA; “SPA” is now confusingly used in the Nepali 
press to refer to either the six-party grouping, or the six plus the 
CPN(M) – although there is no “alliance” binding them. The six 
parties are the Nepali Congress (NC); Communist Party of Nepal 
(Unified Marxist-Leninist, UML); Nepal Sadbhavana Party 
(Anandidevi, NSP (A)); Janamorcha Nepal; Nepal Workers and 
Peasants Party (NWPP); and United Left Front (ULF).  
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the deadline to amend the interim constitution (which had 
specified elections should not be later than 15 December 
2007) expired, party leaders agreed on a new, mid-April 
2008 date but have continued negotiation on other issues. 
The current limbo is not hurting the major political parties, 
or indeed, other powerful institutions. The readiness of the 
six parties in government to accept the postponement 
suggested quiet relief rather than anger at Maoist 
obstruction, although the UML appeared ready to go to the 
polls, and frustrations on other issues (such as Maoist foot-
dragging on land returns) increased. Deferring the verdict 
of a sceptical electorate will not cause major tensions 
within parties and will particularly please sitting members 
of parliament (MPs) concerned about their personal 
prospects. 
Further delay also suits the palace, since the king is likely 
to regain some respect just by his continued silent presence. 
The army has benefited from staying out of political 
machinations, at least in public, and from projecting a solid 
image as a functional institution. Both palace and army 
stand to gain from resurgent nationalist sentiment by playing 
on their reputations for protecting state sovereignty against 
external influence. Although sidelined by the interim 
constitution and formally disowned by major parties, the 
palace is a factor in all calculations. Parties, including the 
Maoists, have maintained discreet contacts: in the delicate 
web of alliances that shape the political scene, the king 
is a power-centre none can ignore and many would like to 
woo. The army, Nepal’s most powerful single institution, 
has tilted slightly away from the king and toward the 
Nepali Congress; a more decisive shift in its stance could 
alter the balance of power. 
For all their threats of mass public action or having their 
PLA fight on for decades, the Maoists’ options are limited. 
They can remain within the political process, while 
simultaneously mobilising extra-parliamentary pressure; 
this could cause great disruption but what it would achieve, 
other than further alienating moderate opinion, is unclear. 
Building critical pressure would require making alliances 
with marginalised groups and others dissatisfied with the 
six-party government; while possible, a significant shift 
in Maoist attitude would be needed to win the trust of 
potential allies.  
Resuming all-out conflict remains a possibility but the 
leadership’s clear antipathy against returning to the jungle 
– with the hope, at best, of eventually regaining the pre-
2005 stalemate and less chance then ever of forging 
alliances – weakens the credibility of this ultimate threat. 
Plans for an urban-based campaign are more credible, 
since the ceasefire enabled the Maoists to build their 
presence in the capital and other major centres, but do not 
offer the hope of a decisive political advantage, much less 
a sustainable victory. The YCL can assert local influence, 
even in Kathmandu, but the strategic leverage it offers is 
not straightforward: its size and extent of deployment act 
as a practical constraint on Maoist options if other parties 
are not willing to cooperate in demobilising it and finding 
alternative employment for its cadres. 
The impasse highlights the structural weaknesses of the 
peace deal. Simply implementing the CPA is not sufficient: 
the agreement is sketchy in many areas, its architecture 
vague and some provisions (for example, on land returns 
and reform and the security sector) cannot be put into 
practice without further negotiations. The low-trust 
atmosphere following postponement of the November 
polls is not encouraging for implementation of existing 
agreements let alone a start on the new talks needed to 
address neglected topics. 
B. A NEW CONSENSUS? 
The governing parties and the CPN(M) agree they should 
continue to work together; most have described the current 
challenge as one of forging a “new consensus”. The 
consensus that underlay the peace deal had survived until 
the Maoist ultimatum of September 2007 but was weak 
in three respects. First, it rested on immediate common 
interests rather than a shared long-term vision.3 Secondly, it 
depended on a roughly equitable power-sharing deal, which 
has been thrown out of balance by NC dominance of 
the government and the Maoist walk-out. Thirdly, it was 
predicated on the idea that the then-SPA and Maoists more 
or less were the political spectrum. From April 2006 
until the end of the year, this was a plausible working 
assumption (royalists of any stripe were tainted, and other 
groups had yet to flex their muscles), but since early 2007, 
the mainstream parties/Maoist combine has looked as if it 
is increasingly less representative of the nation’s political 
character. 
Still, the basic structure is intact, and no one can afford to 
break it. The Maoists cannot go it alone; nor can the other 
parties hope to govern without Maoist consent. Although 
constituent parties are tempted to explore alliances beyond 
the current configuration, none yet looks capable of 
supplanting it. A renewed consensus remains the logical 
first choice and is achievable. 
Principles and policies. The policy basis for a revived 
consensus depends on resolving differing perspectives over 
the long-term goal of the peace process. There is significant 
 
 
3 For an analysis of the contingent nature of the twelve-point 
agreement that first brought the mainstream parties and Maoists 
together, see Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s New Alliance, op. cit.; 
on the convergent interests underlying the CPA, see Crisis Group 
Report, Nepal’s Peace Agreement, op. cit. 
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common ground. For example, the Maoists still point out 
that their understanding of a “democratic republic” is distinct 
from that of other parties but belated discussions on the 
shape of a federal republic suggest the gaps can be bridged. 
The CPA and interim constitution have already chalked out 
the basis for agreement on the fundamental principles 
of a new constitutional settlement; further work on state 
restructuring could give these principles a more concrete 
form. 
Power. The common interest in preserving a grip on state 
power is the best motivation for revisiting its distribution. 
The NC hold on the top positions, already a source of 
annoyance to the other parties, has been buttressed by the 
party’s increased parliamentary weight since its September 
2007 reunification. The NC can block any constitutional 
amendment requiring a two-thirds majority (something that 
was not a given when the Deuba-led NC(D) was able to 
take an independent stance), although it lacks an interim 
legislature (IL) majority and thus runs the risk of further 
defeats on parliamentary resolutions – as well, ultimately, 
of being left as a minority administration should the 
UML withdraw support. 
Apart from the prime ministership, the NC occupies four of 
the five key ministries: home, finance, defence and peace 
and reconstruction (which must sign off on key decisions 
to implement the peace process). The UML-led foreign 
ministry has in effect been bypassed, with the prime minister 
taking major decisions and meeting ambassadors and 
visiting officials separately for all critical consultations. 
The NC’s twin control of the finance and peace and 
reconstruction ministries has ensured a stranglehold on the 
release of post-conflict relief funding and encouraged the 
tendency to view it as one more partisan bargaining tool. 
The shape of government does not help: the concentration 
of powers in the prime minister’s office, especially given 
the lack of a separate head of state and weak checks 
and balances,4 makes it the only meaningful position in 
government and encourages an incumbent to do almost 
anything to retain it. In short, the structure and functioning 
of government are in practice inimical to the stress on 
consensus and cooperation. 
All parties need to use their stake in government to take care 
of their own constituencies: this is part of the political game 
and applies to the CPN(M) as much as to other parties. The 
interim power-sharing deal left both the UML and CPN(M) 
with little influence and patronage in comparison to the NC 
– “just the crumbs off their table”, in the words of one 
analyst. The Maoists are probably not looking for a veto so 
much as a reasonable share in power and the chance to tend 
to their core support base. Aside from headline political 
 
 
4 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Constitutional Process, op. 
cit. 
demands, their key concerns relate directly to delivering 
what their supporters need: cantonment payments and 
facilities, compensation for martyrs’ families, resolution of 
disappearances and support for their injured.5 The Maoists’ 
20 August 22-point demand and 18 September walk-out 
from government were widely interpreted as desperate 
attempts to block an election they feared. However, they 
were also a successful gambit that resulted in the release of 
three more months of delayed cantonment payments – a 
significant sum which may have approached $4.4 million 
(Rs.279,000,000), although the government pushed to 
reduce payments in line with the lower numbers of 
personnel passing verification.6 
Parties. Of the six mainstream parties, only the NC and 
UML have significant weight. Although the breakaway 
NC (Democratic) rejoined in September, the NC remains 
disunited and ill-disciplined. Senior leaders have spoken 
out repeatedly against its adoption of a republican platform; 
the prime minister’s daughter, Sujata Koirala, has led 
attacks on the home minister and calls to scrap the interim 
constitution and return to the 1990 set-up. The UML, more 
than ever the fulcrum of the alliance, remains a delicate 
balance of internal interest groups. More confident than 
others in its electoral prospects, it has sometimes sided with 
the NC against the Maoists and sometimes the other way 
around. Many of its senior members expressed discontent 
at voting with the Maoists in favour of the immediate 
declaration of a republic. 
The Maoists have lost ground domestically and are close to 
squandering the international legitimacy they fought hard 
to gain. They do face concerted opposition and a hostile 
media but this is partly a result of their own actions, partly 
a reversion to old loyalties. The onus is on them to change 
course before they lose trust irreparably. There are some 
signs they have realised this and started to take action. But 
only a serious demonstration of changed behaviour (such 
as immediately halting intimidation and extortion and 
starting to dismantle parallel structures) will make sceptical 
observers sympathetic to their legitimate grievances with 
the shape of the peace process. 
 
 
5 “Rastrapatiko chunav samvishansabhapachhi”, interview with 
Baburam Bhattarai, Himal Khabarpatrika, 2 December 2007. 
6 The government is responsible for cantonment infrastructure. 
It has funded the construction of around three quarters of the 
required accommodation blocks, but overall facilities remain 
poor. It agreed to pay a Rs.3,000 (approx. $50) monthly allowance 
to each registered combatant, regardless of whether they passed 
or failed later verification, and backdated to November 2006. The 
first monthly payment was only released in June 2007, as a lump 
sum transferred to the CPN(M) rather than as individual stipends. 
A second tranche of three-month payments was released to 
Maoist divisional commanders in mid-October. 
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The shape of compromise. Compromise on the two 
headline demands is possible, as illustrated by the 
parliament vote. Top Maoist leaders would prefer to push 
hard for the republican declaration and make concessions 
on proportional representation; more nationalist leaders 
view them the other way around. There is also time to 
cement the deal and make sure it works: the Maoists are 
now talking of a May 2008 deadline for the republic. A 
reasonable split between proportional and first-past-the-
post electoral systems is likely to be viable.7 The Maoists 
are not asking for dominance, however much they trumpet 
the superiority of their ideology. They are willing to be 
second or third players but they wish to be recognised as a 
force and, in their view, the main initiators of the people’s 
movement and the demand for change. They can 
compromise but not at the cost of self-respect. Those in 
other parties who want to see them “exposed” or humiliated 
are an obstacle to progress. 
A reshuffle could also be a convenient excuse for the prime 
minister to drop unpopular ministers; many in the party and 
beyond are unhappy with the performance of senior figures 
such as Home Minister Krishna Prasad Sitaula and Peace 
and Reconstruction Minister Ramchandra Poudel. A new 
consensus will require clear moves toward a revised 
political mainstream. The Maoists are not the only ones 
disillusioned with the old politics; public opinion supports 
the idea of changing the style, as well as substance, of 
governance. 
C. RISKY ALTERNATIVES 
Elections are still viable; if the seven parties will it, they are 
technically and politically possible within the new deadline 
of mid-April 2008. Technical viability rests primarily on 
managing changes in the electoral system: the chief 
election commissioner has warned his staff will need 110 
days to prepare after new legislation is in place reflecting 
any alterations in the mixed system, quotas and regulations 
for parties to implement. Continued wrangling over all 
these aspects suggests meeting this timetable will be tough, 
even if a deal is agreed. In the meantime, alternative 
scenarios are being discussed. Each bears its own risks, 
as does the fragile general situation. 
1. “Conversion” 
Many members of the parties represented in the interim 
legislature are tempted by the idea of extending their 
 
 
7 The 70:30 split publicly proposed by former U.S. President 
Jimmy Carter, who visited Kathmandu in late November, may be 
an acceptable division. It builds on earlier proposals, including 
the 60:40 split originally suggested by the UML and endorsed 
by Indian prime ministerial envoy Shyam Saran. 
transitional mandate and deferring polls in the medium term. 
Parties beyond the six in the government and the Maoists 
might support this if they were brought into a broader 
coalition government. Politicians have for many months 
been quietly floating an option to convert the interim 
legislature (IL), possibly with the addition of some members 
to better reflect diversity, into a constituent assembly. Others 
have suggested that a roundtable or broader national 
conference could be called as a new, more representative 
(but still unelected) body. Either such an assembly or the 
IL, or a combination of the two, could delegate drafting to 
a separate commission. Ratification could be achieved 
via a referendum, through a vote during the first sitting of 
a newly elected legislature or simply, as in 1990, implicitly 
through mass participations in parliamentary elections 
under the new constitutional dispensation. 
Supporters of such alternatives argue that they would 
ensure stability and are not inherently undemocratic: there 
is no universal norm that constitutions must be drafted by 
a specially elected body, and ratification can take various 
forms. The danger is that neither the constitution drafters 
nor the government would retain sufficient legitimacy to 
function, let alone produce a constitution that could stand 
the test of time, any better than Nepal’s past five efforts. 
More specifically, it would be difficult, and perhaps 
dangerous, to settle the sensitive question of the monarchy’s 
future without a clear public mandate. The army has let 
it be known that any attempt to establish a republic without 
a public vote (whether for the constituent assembly or a 
separate referendum) would invite a revolt. The king and 
his supporters would not accept an unfavourable decision 
from an unelected body; confrontation would be almost 
inevitable. In any case, avoiding elections would be 
considered duplicitous by outside observers. A frustrated 
ambassador commented:  
Nobody’s interested in elections – they all want a 
fix.…The parties, and individual MPs, are all scared 
of losing seats. 60 per cent of the current crop of NC 
MPs may go. They’re the ones who started the 
“conversion” idea – it’s a fraud and a betrayal, 
a cynical finesse.8 
2. Elections without the Maoists 
Even though the Maoists need to understand they have 
no veto over elections, trying to force them without Maoist 
participation would likely invite disaster. The idea has been 
floated by Prime Minister Koirala but most other leaders, 
including those of the UML and the NC’s Sher Bahadur 
Deuba, have rejected it. Indian diplomats, however, believe 
the threat must be made seriously:  
 
 
8 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, November 2007. 
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If we get to a situation where the political parties do 
want to go ahead with elections, and the Maoists are 
implacably opposed, then the international 
community should have no hesitation in taking 
a stand with the parties. We have no doubt that 
if the political parties tomorrow wanted to regain 
legitimacy with elections we must support them. 
The Maoists cannot have a veto on the process, and 
saying they must be on board is to grant them a 
de facto veto.9 
There is wide sympathy for the principle that no side should 
have a veto on progress (whether the Maoists or another 
force, such as the NC or the army, whose condition-setting 
is treated with considerably more indulgence). However, 
the reality is that any side with the capacity to block peaceful 
progress does have a de facto veto: the process will always 
require assuaging the suspicions that would tempt anyone to 
wield that veto irrevocably. To call for elections in the face 
of Maoist opposition is in effect to threaten war; regardless 
of moral questions, there is no evidence to suggest a return 
to all-out conflict would be any more successful than in the 
past. Frustration with the royal army’s failure to dent Maoist 
strength was a major cause for New Delhi’s preference of 
a political solution to the conflict in the first place. Without 
a viable plan for victory, talk of military pressure will 
strengthen Maoist militants, reduce the options of those 
willing to argue for compromise and invite confrontation 
without necessarily making elections any more feasible. 
3. Risks in any case 
Political players may feel comfortable but the sensation is 
deceptive. The current configuration can only be sustained 
for a limited period; even in the medium term the risks of 
drift are serious. These risks include: 
Resumed conflict. Neither a return to full-scale conflict 
nor a coup (whether by the Maoists, who retain plans to 
seize power, or by “nationalist” forces, led by the army, 
who have talked up the option of a “democratic coup”) 
is immediately likely but an unintentional slide back to war 
is possible. Apart from the continued co-existence of two 
standing armies, the completion of the UN’s verification 
of Maoist combatants will present a challenge. More than 
10,000 personnel are likely to fail the verification. Plans for 
the rehabilitation of the thousands who will be discharged 
from the cantonments are limited and assume they will be 
content with vocational training and later job opportunities. 
More likely, they will either add to the numbers of the 
militant discontented or be redeployed by the Maoists 
in new roles. 
 
 
9 Crisis Group interview, New Delhi, December 2007. 
Maoist splits. There are already tensions within the 
movement. Some opponents would welcome a split which 
locked some leaders into the democratic process and left 
a small band of diehard renegades to defeat militarily. But 
this is a dangerous course; attempts to engineer a split would 
likely strengthen more militant leaders rather than bolster the 
chances of a stable peace deal. There is no solid evidence to 
suggest that only a few would choose to fight if forced 
to choose sides; it is perhaps more likely that the Maoist 
army’s coherence and commitment would be maintained, 
leaving those calling for peace in a weak minority. 
Mainstream marginalisation. The peace process gave the 
parties an opportunity to redeem themselves. The twelve-
point agreement was explicit: “The seven political parties, 
undertaking self-evaluation, have expressed commitment 
not to repeat the mistakes of the past which were committed 
while in parliament and in government”.10 They have 
not used this opportunity well and might be marginalised 
if politics again becomes a confrontation between more 
extreme elements. 
Communal tensions. There is still no coherent plan to deal 
with ethnic and regional demands. The government’s 
preference for privately negotiating individual deals with 
troublesome groups has only added to the incentives to 
resort to unrest. The deal with the Madhesi Janadhikar 
Forum (MJF) did not sufficiently address grievances (even 
if it had been implemented, only one section of the MJF 
itself supported it – other groups saw it as a sell-out), and 
the tensions that have riven the Tarai show no signs 
of abating. The emergence of a new front makes a renewed 
protest movement all but inevitable: this kind of popular 
mobilisation is the best way for a new party to quickly 
build support. Without a strategy for inclusive negotiations, 
the government may try to impose its will by force, an 
approach that would likely inflame radical sentiment further. 
Already, the call for an autonomous Madhes has moved 
from being a fringe proposal to a central demand of 
formerly moderate leaders. 
Weakening state. Nepal is not yet a failed state but it may 
be coming closer. Without steps to reverse the erosion of 
government capacity and the breakdown of law and order, 
especially across the Tarai, the ability of Kathmandu 
to govern a fractious country will be further reduced. 
Institutions such as the police and judiciary are already 
dangerously low on morale and public esteem. Local 
government officials have used mass resignations, strikes 
and other protests to demand security from the 
government, complaining that it is impossible for them 
to carry out their duties. 
 
 
10 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s New Alliance, op. cit. 
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Continuing stalemate is in itself dangerous. The lack of 
action to address the conditions that allowed the Maoist 
insurgency to start and flourish remain in place, including 
economic inequality and the exclusion of many 
communities from meaningful participation in the state. 
The perception of injustice is more acute and widespread 
than ever. The insurgency’s legacy has, so far, been 
to heighten demands without opening a route to their 
fulfilment and to suggest the utility of armed violence as an 
entry point to otherwise restricted political space. While the 
state remains reluctant to grant concessions on substantive 
issues, it is usually ready to offer impunity for criminal acts, 
a negotiating stance that enhances the attraction of violent 
protest. The situation is more complex and volatile than it 
was before the insurgency – and self-evidently that earlier 
status quo was itself unstable. High public political 
awareness has added to the demands made on the state, 
while its capacity to address them is at a low ebb. The 
conclusion must be that the current stasis is unsustainable. 
III. THE SCORECARD 
A. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE 
The seven parties deserve credit for shepherding the process 
this far without any permanent falling out or return to 
bloodshed, in itself an achievement that many had thought 
extremely unlikely. The ceasefire has held, with no major 
violations by either army. Despite continued intimidation, 
extortion and abductions, Maoist breaches of the CPA have 
not approached the resumption of full-scale military action, 
although they have sharply increased since the August 
2007 plenum, which adopted a more aggressive stance 
in the face of the perceived failure of the peace process to 
deliver results. The basic framework of the peace process 
was put in place: the interim constitution was promulgated 
on 15 January 2007, followed by replacement of the 
revived parliament with an interim legislature incorporating 
Maoist representatives and formation of an interim 
government including five Maoist ministers on 1 April. 
Some steps towards reshaping the state were taken, for 
example the May 2006 declaration of Nepal as a secular 
state and gradual trimming of the king’s ceremonial duties. 
The immediate task of separating and managing the armies 
has been successful. Although the number of Maoist 
weapons registered with UNMIN (3,475) was barely a tenth 
of the number of personnel registered in the cantonments, 
there is no evidence they have hidden large stores.11 The 
 
 
11 The Maoists also placed over 6.7 tons of explosive materials 
under supervision. Many of their fighters used improvised devices 
Nepal Army (NA) fulfilled its side of the bargain, placing 
a similar number of weapons in storage and remaining 
confined to barracks, apart from fulfilling security duties 
permitted by the CPA. UNMIN registered 31,152 Maoist 
personnel in the cantonments and has now completed a 
round of verification. Although no figures have been 
officially released,12 indications are that some 12,000 
personnel have not met the criteria for verification, either 
because of being underage or because they were not part 
of the Maoists’ regular forces before the May 2006 cut-off 
date. Although there were some incidents involving 
weapons designated for leadership and camp perimeter 
security, the Maoists have not removed weapons from 
storage; the NA has similarly refrained from unauthorised 
transport of weapons or other activities. 
Other steps have also been taken. The distribution of 
citizenship certificates went rapidly: 2.6 million by the end 
of May 2007, a largely unsung logistical success. Some 
initial moves followed the commitment to make state bodies 
more inclusive, including the pledge to give 33 per cent of 
government jobs to women; in October 2007, 45 per cent 
of new positions in the Nepal Police and Armed Police 
Force were reserved for marginalised groups. The 
government ratified International Labour Organization 
(ILO) Convention No. 169, on minority rights,13 and in late 
October released funds for district officials to compensate 
the families of 48 activists killed in various clashes and 
protests, most notably the eighteen protestors killed in the 
January-February Madhesi movement and the 27 Maoist 
victims of the March 2007 Gaur massacre.14 
The situation of those displaced during the conflict is 
unclear, with no reliable statistics. Since the CPA, estimates 
suggest the number of internally displaced (IDPs) may have 
fallen from 200,000 to 50,000. An interim report prepared 
by a peace and reconstruction ministry task force has 
estimated a total of 25,000, based solely on compensation 
applications, but expects the number to rise significantly.15 
Chief district officers have been authorised to assess 
applications for benefits, including compensation for 
damaged property, daily allowances and interest-free 
 
 
such as socket bombs and pressure cooker bombs rather than 
guns. 
12 Numbers were given to the government and CPN(M) after 
each cantonment verification but they have not publicised them. 
13 For this convention, see www.ilo.org/public/english/ 
standards/norm/egalite/itpp/convention/index.htm. 
14 On the Madhesi movement and the Gaur massacre, see Crisis 
Group Report, Nepal’s Troubled Tarai, op. cit. Most of the 
Madhesi victims were killed in police action to contain and 
break up demonstrations; the Maoist activists killed at Gaur 
were targeted by a crowd assembled under the banner of the 
Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF). 
15 “Govt figure on IDPs questionable”, The Himalayan Times, 
7 December 2007. 
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agricultural loans.16 Following criticism of a proposed 
truth and reconciliation commission bill, the government 
has shelved the draft and shown a willingness to consult 
more widely before proceeding. 
B. WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE 
It is hard for political leaders to deliver on all fronts 
simultaneously, especially when they cannot escape from 
their inclination to resort to horse-trading over many issues. 
Nevertheless, the parties to the peace process are coming 
closer to identifying urgent priorities. Work in the following 
areas is essential not only to move the process forward, but 
also to regain public confidence and deliver some of the 
benefits of peace that people have been waiting for. 
1. Delivering full peace 
The peace process has brought a cessation of full-scale 
armed conflict but a growth in other forms of insecurity, 
including violent crime and intimidation. Law and order 
is precarious; the judicial system is overstrained and faces 
questions of legitimacy and efficacy. Widespread lack of 
public confidence in policing and justice provides the space 
for Maoist action, which for all its brutality gives many 
people a sense of the order and authority that the state no 
longer commands.  
The Maoists’ YCL has been at the fore of the new wave of 
extortion and pressure tactics, forcing donations, disrupting 
other parties’ activities, assaulting and abducting politicians, 
business people and other perceived opponents,. and 
refusing to relinquish the aim of becoming a parallel 
policing and justice authority.17 The CPN(M) leadership’s 
repeated promises to rein it in are unfulfilled; its cadres 
continue to threaten journalists (and, in two cases, appear 
to be responsible for abducting and killing local journalists) 
and use aggressive labour union tactics to pressure 
businesses. Business people willingly turn to the Maoists 
for dispute resolution, apparently preferring rough but 
speedy decisions to protracted court actions.18 “We don’t 
want to harass anyone”, a Maoist law enforcer in the 
 
 
16 A first tranche of Rs.250 million (almost $4 million) was 
released in early October 2007. Benefits are not lavish, ranging 
from a $1 per day allowance for two months to Rs 10,000 
(approx. $160) as compensation for a destroyed house. 
17 For a detailed assessment of Maoist and state violations 
of the CPA see “Human Rights In Nepal One Year After The 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement”, Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Kathmandu, 12 December 
2007. 
18 See C.K. Lal, “Throwing justice to the wind”, Nepali Times, 
7 December 2007. 
capital said, “but if we receive a complaint we investigate 
it straight away; after all, who trusts the police?”19  
Strikes and shutdowns have severely disrupted everyday 
life.20 Lack of policing and government presence, especially 
in Tarai districts, has exacerbated a widespread sense of 
insecurity. While the state crackdown on demonstrations, 
particularly during the early 2007 Tarai unrest, was harsh, 
there has been little follow-up in terms of arresting those 
responsible for the worst violence, such as the March 2007 
Gaur massacre. Normality has yet to be restored in rural 
areas. The Maoists have made only a limited return of 
seized land, and no mechanism has been put in place 
to oversee returns.21 Local government has not been 
reestablished, although there are indications a cross-party 
agreement may be close. 
Priorities  
? The Maoists should cease all illegal activities and 
pressure tactics, stand down parallel structures 
and start the return of seized property, with a 
government-formed commission established to 
adjudicate on more complex cases of restitution 
and/or compensation. 
? All parties should urgently agree a plan to revive 
local government and explore ways to involve local 
communities in conflict resolution and peacebuilding 
efforts. 
? New security plans are required to address the 
dismal law and order situation, based on local needs 
and community consent rather than heavy-handed 
imposition from Kathmandu, which Madhesi leaders 
have specifically warned will only add to their 
determination to push for autonomy. 
2. Security sector 
The shape of the security sector lies at the heart of the 
peace process and remains one of the main blocks to 
progress. The current situation is unsustainable: the 
continued presence of two armies with no planning for 
their future status is inherently unstable. It is also a great 
financial burden on the state at a time when economic 
development is the most urgent requirement.  
 
 
19 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, December 2007. 
20 From January to August 2007, the CPN(M) and YCL called 
at least 30 bandhs (shutdowns). Other groups, particularly in 
the Tarai, called even more, causing disruption to business and 
communications. 
21 On the lack of progress on seized land returns see “Human 
Rights In Nepal”, op. cit. 
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The UN verification of Maoist personnel is near its end; 
apart from those who have quietly left the cantonments, the 
disqualified are either recent recruits or minors. The latter 
should have been discharged immediately and offered 
rehabilitation packages, but the Maoists insisted on linking 
their discharge to the government’s release of payments. 
The many disqualifications could embarrass the Maoist 
leadership but their claim of a more than 30,000-strong 
force was always exaggerated; privately they were willing 
to more than halve the number of claimed combatants 
in return for other benefits. A more serious problem is that 
many seasoned fighters never went into cantonments; many 
of them appear to have taken command positions in the 
YCL. There is no guarantee that those who are discharged 
will not remain under Maoist command and control in 
other capacities. The assumption that they are waiting 
to be “released” and only wish to return to civilian life is 
unrealistic; many are likely to be committed to the cause 
and willing to be redeployed within the YCL or other 
structures.  
Fighters have also left the cantonments on several occasions 
and have sometimes participated in protest rallies wearing 
combat fatigues and carrying weapons such as knives; the 
Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee (JMCC), which 
consists of army, Maoist and UN representatives, formally 
noted two breaches of the arms-carrying provisions in 
the November 2006 Management of Arms and Armies 
agreement.  
Two steps have been taken. The September 2006 Army Act 
improved the framework for democratic control of the army, 
although it failed to meet some basic norms such as making 
personnel subject to court action for criminal activities, 
including serious rights violations; and the Special 
Committee for the Integration and Rehabilitation of the 
Combatants of the Maoist Army (the “146 Committee”) 
specified in the CPA was finally established on 21 May 
2007, though it has only met once, in July, and its terms 
of reference have not been fixed. Neither of these steps, 
however, has translated into meaningful progress. In 
practice, the army remains autonomous. The new National 
Security Council was established on 22 August 2007 but 
exists only on paper. The government has taken no action 
on the CPA calls to prepare a “detailed action plan” for 
NA democratisation and resizing.22 The “reintegration and 
rehabilitation” of Maoist combatants has yet to be addressed. 
In 2007 the NA has twice embarked on large recruitment 
drives – a violation of agreements, although the recruits 
filled positions left vacant by retirements. The cabinet 
 
 
22 “This shall include tasks such as determining the right number 
of the Nepali Army, preparing the democratic structure reflecting 
the national and inclusive character and training them as per the 
democratic principles and values of the human rights”. CPA 4.7. 
decision to slash the 3,000 to 4,500 troops deployed in the 
royal palace has not been implemented. Some NA generals 
have reportedly met Maoist leaders and indicated 
willingness to consider integration of forces but the NA 
wants to impose its own conditions.23 Although the Maoists 
and the NA appear to be implacable enemies, they share 
certain characteristics (such as a nationalistic outlook 
and preference for firm government) and have shown 
themselves able to work together. The JMCC is probably 
the best example of a functional body established by the 
peace process. It has met 58 times, developed clear agendas, 
mechanisms and secretariat support and built good 
cooperation between members. This is an encouraging 
example for other areas and suggests the start of preliminary 
discussion on future security sector arrangements need not 
be too painful and could generate collaborative goodwill 
to ease tougher, later rounds of deliberation. 
Dealing with the future of the two armies is not optional. A 
peace process that fails to address the longer-term status of 
the warring sides cannot succeed. India, which remains 
determined to delay any reform of the NA, which it sees as 
a bulwark against instability, believes that the international 
attention to security sector reform has encouraged the 
Maoists to raise it, belatedly, as a “ploy” to delay elections. 
However, that the Maoist political leadership has been able 
to raise the issue at all is an encouraging sign of their victory 
over less accommodating colleagues, who were initially 
determined to keep the PLA intact as a separate force for as 
long as possible and more than happy to delay discussion 
until after the elections if it preserved their private military 
capacity.  
No one, including Maoist strategists, recommends rushing 
into restructuring but the start of serious dialogue offers the 
best chance of finding a compromise while the Maoist 
leadership is able to deliver on it. (A deal also presumes 
that the six mainstream parties can control the NA and 
guarantee it has no veto, which might test the NA’s repeated 
assurances it is totally under government control.) The 
alternative is to continue with the PLA as an independent 
military force and the NA confined to barracks – and a 
further extension of UN supervision.  
 
 
23 Prachanda claimed to have held positive direct talks with 
NA generals on integration, but the NA has reportedly set five 
preconditions: (i) full Maoist observance of the CPA and embrace 
of multiparty democracy; (ii) U.S. delisting of the CPN(M) as a 
terrorist organisation; (iii) any integration process to be initiated 
only by a popularly mandated government formed after CA 
elections; (iv) Maoist acceptance of liberal economic policy 
well before integration; and (v) integration to be phased over five 
years. “Maobadisanga senaka panch sart”, Drishti, 4 December 
2007. 
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Priorities 
? The 146 committee should be activated, preparations 
begun on an action plan for the NA and broader 
discussions initiated on national security 
requirements. 
? Decisions should be implemented such as activating 
the National Security Council, carrying out palace 
troop reductions and establishing the political 
and bureaucratic capacity to exercise effective and 
professional civilian control over the army. 
? The government should settle cantonment 
allowances and improve cantonment conditions, 
while the Maoists should discharge those deemed 
ineligible through verification (with support from 
the government and UN on adequate rehabilitation 
programs) and rationalise the cantonment structures 
for the reduced force. 
3. Justice, rehabilitation and reparation 
The peace process has delivered little justice and practical 
assistance to those affected by the conflict. The fate of 
over 1,000 people forcibly disappeared during the conflict 
(most of them apparently from army custody) remains 
unknown.24 Neither side has fulfilled its commitment to 
investigate and report. A June 2007 Supreme Court ruling 
ordered compensation for the families of 83 individuals 
who disappeared from the custody of security forces, 
formation of a disappearances investigation commission 
and drafting of an anti-disappearance law. The 
commission is yet to be set up, though its terms of 
reference have been discussed. The National Peace and 
Rehabilitation Commission, mandated by the CPA to 
“provide relief and rehabilitation works for victims and 
IDPs”, has not been established.  
The proposed truth and reconciliation commission has 
not materialised, though partly for the positive reason that 
public criticism forced the ministry to consult more widely 
on a draft bill. More worryingly, almost no steps have been 
taken to tackle impunity or hold accountable those 
responsible for gross rights violations. For example, despite 
the CPN(M) admission of responsibility, Maoist cadres 
have not been held accountable for the 2005 bus bombing 
at Madi, Chitwan district, that killed three dozen people; 
nor has action been taken against army officers responsible 
for systematic abuses such as the well-documented torture 
and disappearances in Kathmandu’s Maharajgunj barracks 
 
 
24 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) figures 
say 1,042; national NGO estimates are higher. 
from 2003 to 2004.25 The CPA commitment to tackle 
corruption has been quietly forgotten.26 
Priorities 
? All conflict victims need to be compensated in 
non-partisan fashion, preferably through an all-
party mechanism and not just at the discretion of 
home ministry-appointed chief district officers or 
central ministries. 
? An effective commission should be set up with real 
powers to investigate disappearances, drawing on 
international assistance as appropriate. 
? Impunity must be tackled by taking action against 
those accused of the worst violations during the 
conflict. 
4. A restructured, inclusive state 
The CPA made grand promises for reshaping the state. 
Its signatories vowed to form, “at the earliest”, a 
“common development concept for economic and social 
transformation and justice and to make the country 
developed and economically prosperous”.27 They also 
promised: 
To address the problems related to women, Dalits, 
indigenous people, janajatis, Madhesis,28 oppressed, 
neglected, minorities and the backward by ending 
discrimination based on class, caste, language, sex, 
culture, religion, and region and to restructure the 
state on the basis of inclusiveness, democracy and 
progression by ending [the] present centralised and 
unitary structure of the state.29 
The interim constitution reaffirmed a commitment to the 
“progressive restructuring of the state in order to resolve 
the existing problems of the country based on class, caste, 
 
 
25 Action has been taken in a few cases. For example, police 
arrested Maoist cadre Pomlal Sharma and two others in connection 
with the abduction of a journalist, Prakash Thakuri. “Govt panel 
submits report on missing reporter”, ekantipur.com, 7 December 
2007. They also detained Maoists suspected of assaulting a 
trekker who had refused to pay a donation. “Police arrest Maoist 
cadres who thrashed Swiss tourist”, The Kathmandu Post, 7 
December 2007. 
26 “To adopt policy to severely punish people amassing properties 
by means of corruption while remaining in government posts”. 
CPA 3.11. 
27 CPA 3.12. 
28 On Dalits (those at the bottom of the caste hierarchy), janajatis 
(ethnic minorities) and Madhesis (plainspeople) and their political 
mobilisation, see recent Crisis Group reporting, especially the 
briefing Nepal’s Fragile Peace Process, op. cit. 
29 CPA 3.5. 
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region and gender”.30 Few practical steps have followed 
the rhetoric. A promised high-level state restructuring 
commission has yet to plan how restructuring will work, 
although here too there are signs of an emergent consensus 
on the broad framework. Efforts to make the civil service 
and other state institutions more inclusive have been 
sporadic. Of 28 government secretaries appointed to vacant 
posts in October 2007, only two were women and one 
Madhesi; twenty were Brahmans. Individual agreements 
reached with the MJF and the Nepal Federation of 
Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) may not offer a 
comprehensive solution (indeed, such bilateral deals 
undermine the idea of a coherent approach toward all 
groups), but the delays on implementing their provisions 
reflect badly on the government’s will to change.31 
Priorities 
? Improved inclusion of traditionally marginalised 
groups is needed in state structures, political 
parties, peace process bodies and local security 
plan development. 
? The options should be considered for concrete 
affirmative action, such as opening routes into the 
civil service by offering fast-track training or 
preparation for the entry examination. 
? The state restructuring commission needs to be 
formed and measures taken to ensure it includes 
representatives of the marginalized groups it aims 
to benefit and conducts its business transparently, 
taking into account popular aspirations and reporting 
on its discussions to the public. 
? The MJF and NEFIN deals should be implemented, 
for example by political parties improving their 
own representativeness at all leadership levels, 
honouring the victims of protest movements and 
compensating their families and establishing a high-
level task force to determine rules and draft laws 
to ensure inclusion of the traditionally marginalised 
in state structures. 
? Options for canvassing broader opinion should be 
considered, such as a national convention, which 
could form part of a more participatory constitutional 
process without being used as an excuse for further 
postponement of the elections. 
 
 
30 Interim Constitution 2007, preamble. 
31 On these deals, see Crisis Group Briefing, Nepal’s Fragile 
Peace Process, op. cit. 
C. HOW TO GET THERE 
1. Rebuild confidence and cooperation 
The seven parties’ leaders need to convince the public they 
remain committed to the whole process, including the 
elections. This will not be easy. Domestic and international 
opinion is unlikely to be content with a new date and 
renewed verbal reassurances. The seven parties will only 
win trust by showing their unity is more than skin deep, 
implementing the peace deal and demonstrating that they 
have identified and addressed the disagreements that led 
to earlier postponements.  
The Maoists’ primary task is to demonstrate that they remain 
committed to the peace process, including prompt elections, 
and to their own rejection of violence. Recent actions and 
statements have cast serious doubt on these propositions; 
only good behaviour will allay the fears of naturally 
sceptical observers. Peaceful protest is a legitimate political 
tool but the repeated threat to resort to a mass uprising 
suggests little respect for the aim of building cross-party 
consensus. Other parties need to show leadership – both 
by illustrating inclusive, democratic conduct themselves 
and by making greater efforts to assist the Maoists in their 
transformation. 
2. Develop monitoring and implementation 
National monitoring of the peace deal has failed but there 
is little appetite for greater international assistance. 
Viable monitoring can only be carried out by a genuinely 
independent body, but the seven parties would have to take 
the initiative to establish one. The other major aspect of 
improving the process is a realistic plan for implementation. 
There is a growing will to implement agreements but it 
depends on ministries and other bodies to function efficiently 
and in a non-partisan fashion. As long as the peace and 
reconstruction ministry is controlled by the dominant party, 
it will be seen, however unfairly, as less than impartial. Clear 
cross-party consensus might be better served by a neutral 
mechanism that could not only handle contentious issues in 
a balanced way but also help to prioritise tasks – a practical 
necessity given the multitude of demands on a government 
of limited capacity. All-party approval of priorities would 
reduce the chances of delays on certain actions turning 
into party political grievances. 
3. Earn legitimacy and public trust 
The government and constitution are in danger of losing 
legitimacy. The principle of consensus lies at the heart of 
the interim statute, as does the primary goal of making a 
prompt transition to an elected constituent assembly. 
The absence of both has led to serious questions over 
the government’s mandate and authority. The lack of 
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communication and consultation with the public, as well 
as weakness in service delivery, has exacerbated public 
frustration (although this is probably more acute in the 
urban middle classes, which did not suffer so much in the 
war and have seen less benefit in the ceasefire). 
An indefinite postponement of polls would raise more 
serious questions over the government’s legitimacy and the 
status of the interim constitution. Political leaders across the 
spectrum have expressed dissatisfaction with the interim 
constitution. Among them is the prime minister, who has 
hinted at a preference to return to the 1990 constitution and 
complained, somewhat implausibly, that he was pressured 
into accepting the interim constitution against his better 
judgement on the insistence of drafting commission chair 
Laxman Prasad Aryal.32 Senior constitutional lawyers are 
restive; the 1990 constitution drafter, Biswanath Upadhyaya, 
has accused the government of “betrayal”.33 Elections are 
the main step to ensuring legitimacy but they alone will 
only fulfil the original mandate of the people’s movement 
if they deliver a meaningful constitutional process that 
is not directed solely by the political calculations of a small 
handful of parties. Agreement on mechanisms to secure 
public participation in future deliberations would enhance 
confidence in the government and its intentions.34 
4. Bring in other actors 
Complaints that the seven parties had turned the government 
into a self-serving syndicate or even a new form of 
dictatorship were initially confined to the more extreme 
royalist part of the political spectrum. They can now 
be heard from mainstream commentators instinctively 
sympathetic to the major parties but increasingly 
disillusioned with their behaviour. The moderate Nepali 
Times warns that “the Nepali people will not tolerate an 
indefinite seven-party dictatorship.…The people’s verdict 
is that this coalition is unfit to govern”.35 Others, on the left 
and right and speaking for marginalised communities, 
caution that the government’s unwillingness to listen will 
leave a new mass movement as the only alternative. 
Moderate royalists, including structures such as the 
Rashtriya Janashakti Party, have been floating the idea of a 
broader “national government”; other commentators have 
 
 
32 “It Was a Political Mistake to Replace the Constitution of 
1990 by Present Interim Constitution”, interview with G.P. 
Koirala, Spotlight, 29 November 2007. 
33 “Upadhyaya charges seven parties of betrayal”, 
nepalnews.com, 27 November 2007. 
34 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s Constitutional Process, 
op. cit., for recommendations on widening public consultation. 
35 Editorial, Nepali Times, 7 December 2007. 
suggested a neutral caretaker government to oversee 
elections.36 
There may be no alternative to maintaining seven-party 
unity as the engine of the peace process but those parties 
alone cannot claim to speak for the whole of the country. If 
they wish to maintain their position at the heart of the 
political process, they will either have to prove they can 
deliver promptly or reach out to other forces and persuade 
them that they too can be part of the process. Most other 
parties have, however nominally, bought into the constituent 
assembly process. Some, such as the RPP and RJP,37 have 
become more vocal advocates for pushing ahead with 
elections than the parties that devised the plan in the first 
place. The seven parties could build on these openings 
to prove that they are not merely a self-interested syndicate. 
If they do not, they face further loss of confidence and 
the likelihood that individual constituents will seek to build 
their own links outside the club. The Maoists have already 
floated the idea of a nationalist alliance; they and individual 
leaders of other parties have explored links with the 
palace and royalist parties. 
IV. OUTSIDE ANGLES 
The international community is disunited. There is one 
serious division in approach between the majority, who 
view the priority as establishing peace and democracy and 
opening the path to reform, and a minority (particularly in 
New Delhi and Washington) who have always seen the 
main goal of the peace process simply as defeating the 
Maoists, whether by electoral or other means. China has 
become increasingly active, with frequent high-level visitors 
engaging all political forces. India, frustrated with the 
failure to hold elections and worried at weakening leverage, 
appears to be using its influence in the Tarai to pressure 
the parties and underscore its capacity to shape events. 
International players all want to exert leverage on the 
Maoists and other parties to move forward but disagree 
on the question of whether threatening to hold elections 
without the Maoists is viable or useful. Nevertheless, the 
difference between those, mainly India, whose sole focus 
is elections, and others who stress that successful elections 
require overall progress in the peace process, is bridgeable. 
Lack of public unity and perceptions of unwarranted 
intervention have reduced the international community’s 
influence. Political leaders are resentful at being pushed, 
even though they insist they want international support 
 
 
36 For example, Nilamber Acharya, “Five-point solution”, Nepali 
Times, 7 December 2007. 
37 Rastriya Prajatantra Party and Rastriya Janmukti Party. 
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(and the CPA itself urged outside supporters to give it).38 
Direct leverage is limited but concerted international 
pressure to keep the process on track cannot easily be 
ignored. All parties are aware of Nepal’s reliance on 
external aid; none, including the CPN(M), wishes to burn 
bridges with the outside world. 
India. Indian diplomats consistently emphasise that 
they will support whatever the parties agree in terms of 
a compromise on republicanism and the electoral system 
(with the proviso that implementing a republic without 
a vote would invite a dangerous confrontation). They are 
comfortable with the Maoists being guaranteed a role in the 
post-election government regardless of results and believe 
the best solution remains for other parties to help and 
pressure them to sign up to democratic politics definitively. 
New Delhi wants to see the government address Madhesi 
demands “gracefully and without foot-dragging – the 
Madhes is looking for dignity, not spoils – and while trying 
to bring splinter groups into the fold”. The sole focus 
should be the elections: 
On elections our view has always been that they are 
critical. This government and the interim legislature 
are not democratically legitimate. Let the CA 
[constituent assembly] go ahead, come up with 
whatever it wants and we won’t object. But there 
is no peace process unless you have an electoral 
process. If not, you’ll open up political space for 
precisely what you fear.39 
The concern for legitimacy is genuine; it is also bolstered 
by the assumption that election results would provide a 
healthy reality check on the parties’ (in particular the 
Maoists’) actual levels of support. In the words of one 
diplomat, they would be “both catharsis and clarification”.40 
Indian officials remain resolutely upbeat in their assessment 
of their own role, despite voicing multiple frustrations with 
the parties and other international players. They do 
not believe a new approach is needed; nor do they see the 
election postponements as a setback worthy of intensive 
analysis. As one said, “there’s no need for a post-mortem 
of the past election attempts”.41 
Some in New Delhi are less convinced that the Indian 
government has taken the right approach – either for Nepal’s 
interests or its own. High-profile Kathmandu visits by the 
 
 
38 “We heartily urge all the friendly countries and the United 
Nations, as well as the International Community to extend support 
to Nepal in this campaign of establishing full democracy and 
lasting peace”, CPA 10.8. 
39 Crisis Group interview, senior Indian diplomat, New Delhi, 
December 2007. 
40 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, November 2007.  
41 Crisis Group interview, senior Indian diplomat, New Delhi, 
December 2007. 
foreign secretary and prime ministerial envoy Shyam Saran 
did not deliver results. “Shyam Saran’s visit was a failure 
– he didn’t get any takers [in his push for a December 
election]”, commented an experienced Nepal-watcher. 
“India is losing friends. We’re upset with Koirala, the 
Maoists and the UN, and losing the U.S. and UK – so where 
does that leave us?”42 Prime Minister Koirala’s relations 
with New Delhi have cooled; his comments that the Tarai 
unrest could be solved instantly if India cooperated touched 
a raw nerve; politicians of all stripes in Kathmandu believe 
India has deliberately encouraged Madhesi activists, or at 
least refrained from using its influence to rein them in.43 
UN. UNMIN is close to completing the verification of 
Maoist combatants – a task that was delayed by political 
wrangling. The Secretary-General’s Special Representative, 
Ian Martin, since his return from a 25 October briefing to 
the Security Council, has taken a stronger public stance in 
emphasising the need for all parties to do more to implement 
the peace deal, monitor progress, rebuild confidence and 
tackle remaining issues such as security sector reform 
(SSR).44 However it faces challenges in making the most 
of its role. A wave of negative press commentary has 
sought to blame it for delays and to question why such a 
visible deployment has not contributed more to moving the 
peace process forward. As one commentator observed, 
“UNMIN’s presence has so far only ensured that a ‘long-
term ceasefire’ is not broken”.45  
Even those sympathetic to the call for the UN to do more 
in areas such as security sector reform have asked if the 
push for greater attention to neglected aspects of the process 
is not belated. In terms of securing any expansion of 
UNMIN’s formal mandate, it certainly is: widespread 
discontent at the mission’s high profile and expansive 
resources have made it politically impossible to sell the 
idea of a broader role. However, the weaknesses of the 
peace process to which UNMIN has been drawing public 
attention are now increasingly often, and openly, recognised 
by all parties. More transparency about its activities, better 
communication with the Kathmandu media and the general 
 
 
42 Crisis Group interview, New Delhi, December 2007. 
43 One magazine report offered a detailed account of a meeting 
that reportedly took place in Patna, India, involving Madhesi 
activists and Indian government officials, to plan a renewed 
protest campaign. See Sarojraj Adhikari, “Simapariko sanjal”, 
Nepal, 2 December 2007. Regardless of the weight of evidence, 
the assumption that Indian manoeuvring underlies many of the 
recent developments in the Tarai is widespread across all parties 
and civil society groups in Kathmandu. 
44 See press statement, Special Representative of the Secretary-
General Ian Martin, UNMIN, 6 November 2007, at www.unmin. 
org.np/downloads/pressreleases/2007-11-06-UNMIN.SRSG. 
Press.Statement.ENG.pdf. 
45 Bhaskar Gautam, “Nepalma UNMINko kshetradhikar”, Naya 
Patrika, 28 November 2007. 
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population and more sharing of information and analysis 
with diplomatic missions and donor agencies would help 
UNMIN counter some of the criticisms levelled at it. 
India vs. the rest? Indian diplomats are frustrated with the 
UN and what they see as unhelpful public positions taken 
by Western diplomats. Although they want UNMIN to 
fulfil its core mandate and still believe a large international 
presence will help create an intimidation-free election 
environment, they believe it is trying to overstep its mandate 
and has diverted focus from the polls. Some suspect 
prolonged UN involvement will inevitably erode Indian 
influence and open a wider path for additional third parties; 
others have more specific concerns, particularly at the large 
UN presence in the Tarai districts bordering India and 
at direct contacts with political leaders. 
Indian officials all consider a united international voice 
essential but worry that UN and Western public positions 
have distracted from the core task of elections and afforded 
further excuses for delay, especially to the Maoists. Pointing 
to examples of the Maoists echoing international concerns 
about issues such as security sector reform, an official 
complained that “what UNMIN says today, Prachanda says 
tomorrow”.46 Another frustrated Indian diplomat cautioned: 
“The bottom line is: no one should make statements that 
can be used by one party as bargaining chips. It’s not 
good for the international community if they themselves 
become a factor in politics”.47 
In fact, substantive differences in understanding or policy 
are few, and none are unbridgeable. UN and Western 
diplomats insist they see elections as an inalienable part of 
the peace process; their focus on making the process itself 
more functional is simply an essential step if elections are 
to take place and be meaningful. As one Western diplomat 
pointed out, “any roadmap [suggested by the parties] will 
only attract support if it comes with a firm election date”.48 
Neither UNMIN nor governments wish to hand the Maoists 
a veto over the process but only New Delhi believes that 
threatening to proceed without the Maoists is a viable 
option. China may have doubts over the imposition of 
a peace process that it sees as an Indo-U.S. package, 
but it has not used its extensive political contacts to block 
progress. Its public statements have been measured and 
supportive of the process. 
 
 
46 Crisis Group interview, senior Indian diplomat, New Delhi, 
December 2007. 
47 Crisis Group interview, senior Indian diplomat, New Delhi, 
December 2007. 
48 Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, New Delhi, 
December 2007. 
The language agreed for an India-EU joint statement 
following their November Delhi summit suggests the 
outlines of a common platform: 
The leaders expressed deep disappointment at the 
postponement of elections in Nepal. Repeated 
postponement of the elections erodes the credibility 
and affects the process of democratic transformation 
and legitimisation in Nepal. Early elections and a 
mandate from the people are essential for the peace 
process to stay on track. The leaders urged the 
Government and the political parties to honour 
the agreements and commitments already made to 
enable the people of Nepal to choose at the earliest 
their own future and the manner of their governance 
through a free and fair process, open to all without 
intimidation.49 
As all diplomats recognise, there is no simple leverage that 
can be exerted to keep the process on track. All parties, 
and the Maoists in particular, need to be reminded 
that international recognition of their legitimacy is neither 
unconditional nor unlimited – and it can be withdrawn if 
they do not move quickly to secure a popular mandate. But 
other pressures, such as aid conditionality, are unlikely 
to be effective. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Nepal’s peace process was not inherently misconceived 
and can still succeed. However, it has been held back 
by poor political leadership, limited will to implement 
its central provisions and growing mistrust between the 
parties and the public at large. Talk of delaying elections 
has understandable attractions for leaders scared of losing 
power, but there is no viable alternative plan. However 
flawed and incomplete, the CPA is the only stable 
framework on offer. Ripping it up, or circumventing its 
main goal, would invite serious risks. A sceptical public 
has offered the mainstream parties and the Maoists the 
chance to redeem themselves and seek a new mandate for 
change. If they do so, they will also serve their partisan 
interests. If they fail, the public will have little sympathy 
for a collective betrayal of its aspirations. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 18 December 2007 
 
 
 
49 India-EU Joint Statement, New Delhi, 30 November 2007, 
at www.delind.ec.europa.eu/en/political_dialogue/summits/ 
eighth/8_joint_statement.pdf. 
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